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It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a
roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third-class seats that some
company or other has open carriages with wooden benches .... What the company
is trying to do is to prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from
travelling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to
frighten the rich .... And it is again for the same reason that the companies,
having proved almost cruel to third-class passengers and mean to the second-class
ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class passengers. Having refused the poor
what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an essay about economic analysis, price discrimina-
tion, and the world of digital content.2 In the interest of full disclo-
* James Boyle © 2000. Thanks go to Ian Ayres, Yochai Benkler, Julie Cohen, William
Fisher, David Lange, Neil Netanel, Stephen Parr, and Jerome Reichman. Kim Life and Kristi
Severance researched expertly.
1. JULES DUPUIT, ON TOLLS AND TRANSPORT CHARGES 23 (International Economic Papers
No. 11, Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1962).
2. Two bodies of work deserve particular acknowledgment as inspirations for this Essay.
First, the writings of Hal Varian on differential pricing for information goods. See Hal R. Varian,
Differential Pricing and Efficiency, 1 FIRST MONDAY (Aug. 5, 1996), http://www.firstmon-
2007
2008 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 53:6:2007
sure, I should warn the reader that in this Essay I will take a
slightly different attitude towards the economic analysis of intellec-
tual property than most, though perhaps not all, of the contributors
to this fascinating symposium issue; I will be focusing on economic
analysis as a type of rhetoric. By rhetoric, I do not mean bluster,
nor do I mean to suggest that economic analysis is merely an apolo-
gia for conclusions arrived at for other reasons.3 I use the term
"rhetoric" in a way closer to one of its positive classical senses:
something between Aristotle's deliberative rhetoric and the looser
sophistic concept, a way of interpreting and understanding "an in-
complete, ambiguous and uncertain world."4 Thus, to focus on eco-
nomic analysis as a form of rhetoric is not an insult to economic
day.dk/issues/issue2/different; Hal. R. Varian, Pricing Information Goods 6 (June 15, 1995),
available at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/Papers/price-info-goods.pdf; Hal R. Varian, Ver-
sioning Information Goods, 1-2 (Mar. 13, 1997) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/Paperslversion.pdf. Second, William Fisher's influential arti-
cle on price discrimination and the responses to it. See William W. Fisher III, Property and Con-
tract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1234-40 (1998); Yochai Benlder, An Unhurried
View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); Julie
Cohen, The Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property
as Price Discrimination Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV 1367, 1387-88 (1998). I
should note that Professor Fisher's article has as its goal using the lure of the profits available
from state-backed price discrimination to induce the content industries to accept limitations on
their rights in the public interest. Thus, though some of my criticisms would apply to the effi-
ciency and innovation benefits he claims for price discrimination, his work runs counter to the
expansionist intellectual property agenda I describe here.
3. That is sometimes true of any form of analysis, of course. In intellectual property policy,
the Congressional Record is particularly full of dubious economic studies; odes to the importance
of providing incentives to the dead and supposedly scientific lists of reasons why the policy
predilections of content providers must necessarily be enacted as law. Yet, such a characteriza-
tion hardly describes the erudite and frequently critical account of the implications of economic
analysis for intellectual property offered in this volume. More generally, those forms of economic
analysis that measure social welfare in terms of ability and willingness to pay certainly have an
apologetic aspect, though perhaps not an apologetic intent; absent a justification for the initial
distribution of rights and wealth, their analyses both track and reinforce existing institutions
and patterns of wealth distribution, and do so without a normative reason for us to think that
such a result is good. Under Chicago school analysis, for example, rights are given to those who
are willing and able to pay the most for them, prior wealth increases one's ability to pay and thus
one's utility, higher valuations which result from greater wealth (at least in consumptive, rather
than productive valuations of assets) will make it more likely that one will be granted rights, and
hence still greater ability to pay in the future. See C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic
Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 11-22 (1975). It is irresistible to note also that the Chi-
cago schoors preferred criminal justice system seems to be one where those who can afford it pay
fines rather than suffering prison terms. Thus, it is literally true to say that under a Chicago
school analysis, "the rich will get richer and the poor will get prison." While there are many
kinds of economic analysis, most but not all rely on the "ability and willingness to pay" measure.
4. SONJA K. FOSS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RHETORIC 3 (2d ed. 1991); see
also GEORGE A. KENNEDY, A NEW HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC 51-63 (1994); James B.
White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L
REV. 684, 687-88 (1985).
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analysis, though it is a signal that I think that the answers it pro-
vides are more partial, in both senses of that word, and more inde-
terminate than many economists and most policy-makers seem to
believe. In particular, I will be focusing in this Essay on the way in
which some of the most important issues in digital intellectual
property policy are decided by a pre-reflective process of categoriza-
tion from which the analysis flows. Information economics as a dis-
cipline does indeed enlarge our understanding of some very impor-
tant intellectual property questions, but I believe that the answers
it offers are, on both empirical and theoretical grounds, much more
open than is generally accepted. Indeed, one of its main contribu-
tions may be in offering us plot-lines and econo-dramas, ready-
made images of types of dysfunction in information markets that
sharpen our perceptions of potential risks and benefits. Unfortu-
nately, it tends to offer them in antagonistic and mutually annihi-
lating pairs.
Three further caveats are in order. To say all of this is not to
say that the economic analysis of information issues is perceived by
economists as having the openness and manipulability that I de-
scribe here. Indeed, quite the opposite is true, though I would argue
that the source of that certainty has to be sought outside the walls
of the discipline itself in less obvious and less scientific processes of
classification. Nor is it to say that the consensus among real, as op-
posed to law-office, economic analysts of intellectual property al-
ways aligns with a particular set of economic interests or market
institutions; readers will find in this volume a large number of
criticisms of both the current agenda of the content industries, and
considerable skepticism that the existing institutions of world trade
actually offer the benefits to the developing world claimed for them
by their defenders. Finally, though I argue that economic analysis
is both more open and more indeterminate than some of its practi-
tioners seem to believe, not all viewpoints are equally easy to ex-
press in economic rhetoric,5 nor is all economic rhetoric equally
pleasing to the public ear.
Having said all of this, I hasten to add that economically
minded readers impatient with such folderol about rhetoric should
find my discussion perfectly conventional in most of its analysis;
the only way to make my point is internally, within the structure I
am describing.
5. "When one of these non-economic categories is threatened, and if we happen to love it,
we invent subterfuges to give it economic importance .... It is painful to read those circumlocu-
tions today." ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 210-11 (1949).
20001 2009
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II. ECONOMIc RHETORIC AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The question I wish to study is this: Will the economic analy-
sis of price discrimination provide the new economic rhetoric to jus-
tify the next stage of intellectual property expansionism in the
United States? Over the last twenty years, there has been an enor-
mous extension of intellectual property; a far-ranging enclosure
movement over the public domain, paralleling the eighteenth cen-
tury's enclosure of common lands. Intellectual property rights have
been broadened to cover more subjects, deepened to cover them for
a longer time, widened to cover them in more ways. Current law is
actually nibbling at the two areas that supposedly could never be
owned, facts and ideas respectively. 6 Given the inventiveness of the
lawyers and lobbyists for the holders of intellectual property, this
may seem like an unwise challenge to issue, but at a certain point
they will run out of commons to enclose. Alexander is reported to
have wept when he found had no new worlds to conquer. Jack Va-
lenti and Hilary Rosen are unlikely to do the same.7 Where will
they turn when they run out of new areas to commodify and how
will they justify themselves to policy-makers and to the public?
The plan is fairly easy to work out. After claiming new,
larger and longer intellectual property rights, the next step is to
engage in much more fine-grained regulation of how that intellec-
tual property can be used. Owners of content will rely on shrink-
wrap contracts and technological restraints to strip users of the
standard rights offered by intellectual property systems: the right
of fair use, first sale and so forth. Software, music, e-texts, and
movies will be licensed rather than sold to users. As a result, some
of the privileges people take for granted with a book-the ability to
lend it, resell it, criticize it, parody it and so on-will be explicitly
waived by contract. 8 Technological encryption and watermarking
6. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that data transformed by a machine's calculations into a share
price produces a useful result and is therefore not necessarily unpatentable); Collections of In-
formation Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy
Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998); Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy
Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).
7. Jack Valenti is the President and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America;
Hilary Rosen is President and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America.
8. See J. H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 875, 943-47 (1999). Whether those contracts will be enforceable is another matter and a
problematic one, bringing up constitutional issues of pre-emption and First Amendment protec-
tion. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1248-53 (1995). The current trend has been towards the enforceability of such contracts,
2010 [Vol. 53:6:2007
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schemes will be used to tie digital objects to particular people and
computers, so that there are physical as well as legal restraints on
the use of those objects. These schemes will prevent (or at least
hamper) not only black market "piracy" of intellectual property, but
also "gray market" resale, non-market gift, or loan transactions and
competitive attempts at decompilation and reverse engineering.
The creation of new (or extension of old) intellectual property
rights requires state intervention. Yet many of the measures I have
just described sound as though they could be achieved by private
parties acting alone; rewriting contracts, changing encryption
schemes, and so forth. Of course, the legal system would still be
strongly implicated because the rules of contract and property
would form the background to the transaction. But is a rule change,
rather than merely rule enforcement, required to achieve this level
of control of both goods and users after the initial market transac-
tion? The answer is yes. Many things stand in the way of the meas-
ures I have described. Contracts of adhesion are sometimes unen-
forceable under current law. State law rules affecting intellectual
property rights might be pre-empted by federal copyright and pat-
ent law. Antitrust rules affect the ability of companies to engage in
resale price-maintenance agreements. Privacy protections might
interfere with companies' ability to monitor the use of their prod-
ucts. Fair use gives privileges to decompile software for competitive
purposes and so on. The progress of surmounting these "obstacles"
has already begun with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 the
model Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA"),10 and a variety of court decisions, but it still has some
way to go. How will the content providers move from persuading
the legislature to grant them new property rights over information
goods, to persuading the legislature to facilitate their ability to con-
trol those products in the after-market?"
To answer this question I want to start with a thought ex-
periment. Imagine a world very like our own except for the fact that
economists have much greater power and respect. Call it Econo-
World. Public debate there is almost exclusively in economic terms,
and the level of sophistication is high. Lobbyists make careful eco-
but it has been much criticized. See generally Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract
Law in the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the
Future of Information and Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (1998).
9. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998).
10. Unif. Computer Information Transactions Act (1999).
11. Obviously, in any Hohfeldian analysis, the two stages overlap. What do we mean by
"property right?" Still, the distinction captures something important.
20001 2011
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nomic arguments (rather than straightforward economic payments),
to a respectful legislature eager to wrestle with the fine details of
the analysis. Imagine also, that the arguments come in two stages.
First, lobbyists come to the legislature asking for new, increased
intellectual property protection, relying in part on the threats posed
by the new digital technologies and the Internet in particular. Sec-
ond, having been granted at least some of their wishes, they return
to ask the legislature to relax those rules that interfere with their
ability to control intellectual property goods in the after-market: to
validate contracts of adhesion and shrink-wrap licenses, declare
that it is a crime or at least a tort to break through a digital fence
even if your conduct was otherwise privileged, to allow resale price-
maintenance agreements, limit fair use, abolish first sale, and so
on.
The economic analysis used to justify the first stage is fa-
miliar, though much more controversial in practice than many pol-
icy-makers seem to understand. The argument goes something like
this. Information is a public good, non-excludable and non-rival. It
is hard to stop one unit from satisfying an infinite number of users
at zero or close to zero marginal cost. Under such conditions, pro-
ducers of information and information goods will have inadequate
incentives, leading to under-production. If I could create a useful
digital restaurant guide at great expense but can sell only one copy
before my whole market disappears, then I will hardly make the
effort in the first place. The solution to this public goods problem is
intellectual property. By creating a limited monopoly called an in-
tellectual property right, we can give producers an adequate incen-
tive to create. This basic argument has been used again and again
to justify the creation and then the extension of the intellectual
property system; new media such as the Internet are claimed to
take content even closer to the image of a perfect public good, be-
cause costless copying and global networks mean that the software,
digital text, or music in question is even less excludable and even
less "rival." I don't even have to give up my book or movie for the
time that it would have taken to duplicate it; digital objects already
reside on a global network. As the subjects of intellectual property
approach asymptotically to being perfect public goods, goes the ar-
gument, so must intellectual property protection increase in
strength.
Though this argument is paraded in both economic textbooks
and congressional testimony, it turns out that things are not so
[Vol. 53:6:20072012
CRUEL, MEAN, OR LAVISH?
simple at either the theoretical or the empirical level. After all, an
intellectual property right is a monopoly, is it not?12 Economists
normally think of monopolies as imposing deadweight losses.'3 So at
the very least one might expect some skepticism that the benefits in
terms of encouraging innovation and the production of information
goods would be offset by the costs of the monopoly. When one goes
deeper it turns out that the issue is even more complicated. First,
economists such as Grossman and Stiglitz point out that there is a
fundamental conflict between the incentives needed to produce in-
formation and the efficiency with which that information is dis-
seminated. In an article entitled On the Impossibility of Informa-
tionally Efficient Markets, they point out that the marginal cost of
information is zero, but if information is distributed at zero cost, as
required in an efficient market, producers will not have an ade-
quate incentive. 14 On the other hand, if information producers are
rewarded, information is not costless and market decisions made
using that information cannot be perfectly efficient. Since the cy-
bernetic, self-organizing rationality of markets depends precisely on
the distributed analytical processing power of market participants
who digest information and make choices accordingly, this point is
of central importance. It seems to suggest that the idea of a perfect
market in information is internally contradictory even in theory. It
lends new force to the idea that monopolies over information and
information goods may lead to dynamic inefficiencies, as well as
merely to the normal passive welfare losses associated with monop-
oly pricing. In practice, it also helps to explain a fundamental dif-
ference in economic outlook. Certain individuals and even certain
organizations, seem to approach economic issues with particular
sensitivity to the public goods problems I described above. 15 They
focus on the necessity of ensuring adequate incentives, and tend to
minimize or ignore both the welfare losses involved in monopoly
pricing and the possible costs to efficiency and innovation. Other
individuals and organizations are more focused on efficiency, cos-
12. This point is disputed, as we will see later. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
13. Under standard assumptions, the monopolist will receive the greatest return by pricing
at a level that excludes a part of the market that is willing and able to pay above marginal cost
for the product.
14. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility ofInformationally Effi-
cient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
15. The Patent and Trademark Office (TTO") is a good example. See James Boyle, Intellec-
tual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 58-111 (1996)
(debating the wisdom of the administration's intellectual property policy with Bruce Lehman,
then head of the PTO).
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tless information flows, and the dangers of market concentration. 16
To them, innovation is more likely to suffer when the inputs for in-
novation are over-priced or monopolistically controlled, than when
the outputs of innovation fail to receive legal protection. Though
economics is supposed to be the science of tradeoffs, this theoretical
conflict is deeper than merely the need to balance speed with safety
or eating pleasure with waistline size. The argument is that infor-
mationally efficient markets are impossible in theory, and though
this claim has been rejected, generally without discussion, it has
not yet been refuted. On a more practical level, though, one might
imagine pragmatic economists judiciously weighing the incentive
effects of intellectual property against the possible static and dy-
namic efficiency costs. This does happen of course, but it is remark-
able how fundamentally the choice of the starting point seems to
affect the analysis. Some who look at fair use, for example, see a
limited exception, a defense for actions that otherwise would violate
a property right. This defense is instituted largely to avoid the
transaction costs of getting permission for every piddling use. The
"paradigm case" for fair use here would be quoting a few lines of an
article. The increasing efficiency in information systems could make
even this limited exception unnecessary by lowering transaction
costs: for example, by instituting an Internet copyright permissions
clearing center. Others see an affirmative privilege on the part of
users and future creators, protecting against both the dangers of
monopolistic pricing and the dangers that future innovation would
be chilled. The paradigm case for fair use here would be something
like parody or the privilege of software developers to decompile
software in order to assure interoperability. The protagonists of
each view rarely ignore the other view completely, but the structure
of the analysis is built up around opposite pictures of the core
problem and of the penumkral issues to be skirted in solving it. The
issues do not come ready-labeled, and the process of pre-theoretical
classification is a fascinating one. "Balancing" does go on, but it is a
balancing the outcome of which has been strongly affected by the
way the issue is constructed in the first place.
But even if we focus mainly on the incentives necessary to
produce information, applying public goods theory to intellectual
property turns out to be a little more complicated. First, what pub-
16. The Justice Department seemed to take exactly this attitude in the recent Microsoft
trial, showing skepticism towards Microsofes claims that it was merely doing that which its
intellectual property rights allowed it to do.
2014 [Vol. 53:6:2007
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lic goods problem are we talking about, the production of informa-
tion or the production of innovation? Both have some of the charac-
teristics of public goods, they tend to be linked in practice, yet they
also have significant differences. Existing intellectual property law
protects some of each, but in the United States, at least, it is consti-
tutionally focused on originality. In practice, however, that re-
quirement is both minimal and increasingly irrelevant for reasons
that I will discuss later.
Beyond the question of whether intellectual property is pro-
tecting innovation or information, an issue that would deserve its
own article, there are other difficulties. Are the subjects of intellec-
tual property actually "non-excludable," so that it is impossible to
exclude non-purchasers from consuming the good? Indeed is "non-
excludability" actually part of the definition of a public good at all?
Frequently there is confusion between the public good con-
cept as I understand it, which states that it is possible at no addi-
tional cost for an additional person to enjoy the same unit of a pub-
lic good, and a different concept that might be identified as a collec-
tive good, which imposes the stronger condition that it is impossible
to exclude non-purchasers from consuming the good.17
Whatever the definition used, in practice, it is far from clear
that information or information goods are indeed non-excludable,
on or off the Internet.
Information goods do not exist in isolation. The good (e.g.,
the knowledge of how to make a new type of self-developing photo-
graphic paper, a software program, the data stream of an unen-
crypted network TV broadcast) comes "bundled" with a large num-
ber of other customer needs, social implications, market effects, and
business opportunities. These linked or bundled phenomena may
well be excludable to a greater degree than the information good
itself. Absent an intellectual property right, the good itself (the in-
vention, say) may be hard to exploit without revealing information
about it, and thus potentially losing one's position of market advan-
tage. But, as Hirshleifer points out, the inventor is in a privileged
position in terms of another piece of information-the effects that
the invention will have on the existing industries in the market-
and this piece of information can be exploited profitably before reve-
lation destroys the market.'8 (For example, by selling short the
17. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 295
(1970).
18. See Jack Hirshleffer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to In-
ventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 570-72 (1971).
20001 2015
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shares of competing companies whose revenues will decline.) Open
source software companies distribute software that can be, and is,
freely copied and redistributed by competitors. Nevertheless, they
argue that their version comes with a set of associated features
(documentation, support lines, assurance of continuity in develop-
ment) which are much more excludable than the software itself, and
which will support a viable business. Admittedly, some imagination
may be required. The "product" itself may change so as to take ad-
vantage of different degrees of excludability. Consider an example
from beyond the boundaries of intellectual property policy, broad-
cast network television. It appears to be a classic public good, non-
excludable and non-rival. If one was designing such a business from
scratch, one might choose to exclude by technical means (encrypting
the signal), by legal means (imposing a licensing tax on television
receivers and using the fees gathered to support the television
channel), or by changing the business model altogether. It is hard
to exclude any viewer with a set from receiving the signal. It is
easy, however, to exclude an advertiser's tape from one's broadcast
unless one has received adequate payment. By moving the business
model from sale of content to viewers, to sale of eyeballs to adver-
tisers, the excludability problem is "solved."
One cannot focus on excludability alone, however. It is im-
portant to remember that in the absence of intellectual property
there are changes in the economics of both the payment for outputs
from, and the cost of inputs into, the creative process. The creator
of the information good may find that the types of "bundled exclud-
ability" that I describe give less leverage, less ability to exclude,
and therefore less pricing power to demand payment for access than
an enforced set of intellectual property rights would give. (Obvi-
ously this is an empirical question, not susceptible to purely theo-
retical resolution.) However, operating in the absence of intellectual
property, either in general, or over the particular resource in ques-
tion, the cost of the inputs for the new creation may well also be
lowered. (This, too, is an empirical question.) The creator need not
pay as much in licensing fees for the raw materials (database ex-
tracts, programming tricks, prior lines of code, cell lines, fragments
of prior songs, methods of conducting surgical operations) that are
used to create the new product. At the end of the day, do the
changes in excludability under the new regime balanced against the
changes in the costs of inputs, together mean that there is no longer
adequate incentive to future creators? Again, it would be strange to
[Vol. 53:6:20072016
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imagine that the question could be resolved at the theoretical level,
but the debate itself proceeds with hardly any empirical evidence. 19
Since intellectual property is a familiar and accepted part of
both our world and Econo-World, these discussions tend to take
place against the background of some suggestion that rights should
be expanded, normally under the impetus of a perceived threat from
some new technology of reproduction or distribution or both. But
this merely adds an additional unknown element to the problems
discussed above. Take the Internet as an example. The Internet
certainly lowers the costs of copying. At the same time, it will lower
the costs of distribution and advertising. Even a limited and static
assessment of the effects of these changes would have to work out
whether the losses to intellectual property owners from the in-
creased ease of copying were greater or smaller than the benefits
from ease of distribution, advertising, and reproduction. A more
complex assessment would turn to the increased importance of net-
work effects. If your computer is a stand-alone and you rarely ex-
change files, then the fact that most people use Microsoft Word is
much less important to you than if you are on a global network con-
stantly exchanging work with others. Are the losses to Microsoft
from the increased ease with which Word could be pirated, greater
or lesser than the benefits they get from network effects? We do not
know the answer. What will be the effects on innovation of this in-
crease in the importance of network effects? Does it argue for
greater intellectual property protection or, to the contrary, a re-
moval of protection from any protocol around which standardization
could occur? Again, the issue is an extraordinarily complex one.
To be sure, the defenders of intellectual property do not lie
quiet during this litany of doubts. Among other things, they argue
that intellectual property rights are not monopolies, they are prop-
erty rights. 20 Most property rights allow owners to refuse to sell
19. See WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS:
APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) 2-3 (Na-
tional Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://papers.nber.orglpapers; BRONwYN H. HALL & ROSE MARIE HAM, THE PATENT PARADOX
REVISITED: DETERMINANTS OF PATENTING IN THE US SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY, 1980-94, at 2-3
(National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7062, 1999), available at
http://papers.nber.orglpapers; ADAM B. JAFFE, THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: POLICY
INNOVATION AND THE INNOVATION PROCESS 1-2 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 7280, 1999), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers; Pablo Challi et al., The Conse-
quences of Pharmaceutical Product Patenting, 15 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 65, 115
(1991); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174-
75 (1986).
20. "Rights to exclude are not monopolies just because the property involved is an intangi-
ble rather than something you can walk across or hold in your hand." Frank H. Easterbrook,
2000] 2017
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
even when offered an amount greater than marginal cost. The ques-
tion of whether a monopoly exists is one that is determined by the
availability of substitute goods, not the shape of the legal entitle-
ment. If there are substitute goods available for most intellectual
property products, then competition will drive the price closer to
marginal cost, and we will not have the static allocative efficiency
losses typical of monopoly pricing. This argument is not so persua-
sive in dealing with the claim that intellectual property rights can
also cause dynamic innovation losses, nor does it address the more
basic question of whether intellectual property rights are necessary
at all in a particular case. Still, it does attempt to take the blight of
"monopoly" away from the intellectual property right, both in
popular discussion and in economic debate. This argument over the
question of whether intellectual property rights are monopolies will
be ironically revisited when we turn to the question of price dis-
crimination.
Let us say though, that our legislators are convinced of the
need for expanded intellectual property protection, particularly in
the digital arena. Citing the dangers of world-wide piracy, armed
with search lists from Gnutella, and file lists from Napster, and
clutching reports on the inadequate incentives provided to the com-
pilers of databases, they agree to raise the level of intellectual
property rights. Software will be covered by patent as well as copy-
right. The definition of copying will be broadened. Patent law will
be applied to cover business methods and mathematical algorithms
embodied in software form. Trademark will be expanded beyond its
traditional ambit. The copyright term will be lengthened, civil and
criminal penalties increased, and new rights created over compila-
Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 108, 118 (1990). The classic
statement of this proposition was made by Edmund Kitch. See Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Mo-
nopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & EcON. 31, 33 (1986); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 274-75 (1977). The degree to which the
dynamic innovation issue is addressed varies in the literature. Notice in the following example
how the author goes from chiding others for their improper classification to assuming that more
patent protection results in greater technological innovation.
Improper categorization of intellectual property rights as monopolies in the
negative sense is traceable to the ambiguity surrounding the term "monopoly."
This ambiguity has its roots in English common law, antitrust law, and the cy-
clical judicial hostility toward patents. It has created confusion that has re-
sulted in courts' crossing the line from ambiguously using the term "monopoly"
to affirmatively labeling patent rights as anticompetitive and contrary to the
public interest. This judicial mindset increases the likelihood of patents being
held invalid during infringement litigation, which negatively impacts patent
filings, thereby inhibiting technological innovation and economic growth.
Simone A. Rose, Patent "Monopolyphobia": A Means of Extinguishing the Fountainhead?, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 526-27 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
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tions of facts. 21 To all of these proposals, the government, and
slightly less enthusiastically, the courts, agree. The legislature goes
into recess and the economists and lobbyists on both sides take a
deep breath.
In Econo-World, however, the content industries are relent-
less in their pursuit of legally guaranteed market advantage. When
the next session of the legislature convenes, they return with a new
set of demands. They argue that is not enough that they be given
expanded intellectual property rights. There are still holes in the
system after the user has made the contract; perfect control eludes
them. The Econo-land legislature has left the "first sale" rule intact
so that users could actually sell their programs, e-texts, and music
once they were finished with them. Digital objects could also be
given away. I may no longer want the quilting program, or the
Benedictine monks' a-capella disco highlights. As far as I am con-
cerned, they are just taking up space on my hard drive. In Econo-
land, however, I may give them to you, provided I erase them from
my hard drive, which is what I wanted to do anyway. Resellers may
buy the product from the producer and then resell it at a lower
price than the one the producer would like to maintain. All of these
aspects of the law interfere with the producer's ability to achieve
the perfect pricing curve, 22 selling to each user at a different price,
carefully calculated by tracking users' purchasing habits and buy-
ing practices using "cookies," credit card reports, and other moni-
toring methods. Users also retain a troubling degree of freedom in
other respects. Competitors may buy your products, strip out the
uncopyrighted parts, and use them to compete with you.2 3 This
problem has been partly mitigated by the recent intellectual prop-
erty reforms in Econo-World, of course, because there are now pre-
cious few components of any product that are not protected by in-
tellectual property. Technology can also be used to embed identifi-
ers in programs and digital content can be registered to particular
users in ways that make it hard to transfer. Contracts can be writ-
21. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. IV 1998)); No Electronic Theft Net Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506-07, 18 U.S.C. §§
2319, 2319A, 2320 (Supp. IV 1998)); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act. Hearings on H.R.
2652 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Laura D'Andrea Tyson), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41118.htm.
22. See generally Cohen, supra note 2.
23. Cf. ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
buyer of software containing data compiled from 3,000 phone directories was bound by shrink-
wrap license limiting data use to non-commercial purposes).
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ten which require users to relinquish their rights under intellectual
property law. In theory, the user can always go elsewhere, but lack
of knowledge about the content of the licenses together with the
lock-in exercised by network effects, all operate to make the market
less than efficient in that regard. If Microsoft Word requires a par-
ticular licensing agreement, telling the user that they can always
buy Boyle's word processing software is little consolation.
But the scheme is not yet foolproof. If the content provider
builds a digital fence, then users would still have a privilege to
break it down in order to exercise their fair use rights. If they broke
it down and then violated one of the right-holder's exclusive rights
they would, of course, be liable for that violation. However, in
Econo-World the content owners have not yet been given a legal
power to fence off portions of the public domain simply by express-
ing with their technology the wish that users not have access to it.24
As for the licensing contracts, they are of uncertain validity and
uneven legal effect because of constitutional pre-emption issues,
and state law provisions invalidating certain contracts of adhesion.
There are also occasional annoying, non-derogable, consumer pro-
tection guarantees which licenses cannot override. Finally, the
growth in availability and sophistication of open source software
means that consumers might one day have more of a choice, pro-
vided of course that the open source software can achieve
interoperability, and thus do most of the things that closed, pro-
prietary software can do; showing DVD movies, for example. 25
The answer to these flaws is to have the state step in and
put its stamp firmly on the content industries' preferred trifecta:
expansive intellectual property rights, digital fences, and enforce-
able click-wrap licenses. If it could be made a crime or at least a
tort to break through a digital fence, regardless of whether one's
purpose was licit or illicit, then technological restraints on use in
the after-market would be that much more secure. More impor-
tantly if it could be made a crime to create programs or devices
that allowed others to get through the digital fence, then the only
the most technically savvy consumers would be able to do so. Think
of barbed wire. Ranchers want to use barbed wire to protect their
herds, but the wire will enclose not only their lands but also por-
tions of the commons. The state can do three things. It can forbid
24. Our world is more advanced than Econo-World in this regard.
25. See Amy Harmon, Anarchic R-Commerce: Online Davids vs. Corporate Goliaths, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, § 4, at 1; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, No. 00-Civ.-
0277, 2000 WL 1160678, at *2 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 17, 2000).
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the use of barbed wire. It can allow it, but also allow others to use
wire cutters to get through it, punishing them if they rustle cattle
but leaving them alone if they merely exercise their free range
rights. Finally, it can make it a free-standing tort to cut barbed
wire, regardless of one's purpose, and then it can outlaw the pro-
duction of wire cutters. The content industries pick option three,
and they also ask that the rules of contract, intellectual property,
antitrust and a variety of other fields be changed so as to allow
their preferred set of contractual restraints, resale price mainte-
nance agreements, and so on. One happy result of this regime is
that it will also make it harder for "interoperable" open source
software to be developed; I can't get my open source software to
work with your DVD format without either breaching your licensing
agreement or breaking through your digital fence, or both. Thus it
has the advantage of maximizing one's control of the existing mar-
ket and beating off a challenge from a potential future competitor
at the same time.
How is all of this to be justified? To be sure, one could point
to the same threats from digital piracy that were used to justify the
first round of expansion. Again, it could be taken on faith that ex-
isting forms of excludability are inadequate, that the extra leaki-
ness of a digitally networked system more than offsets its advan-
tages in lowering the cost of distribution and advertising, that in-
creasing the rights of creators and content providers will produce
greater innovation rather than raising the cost of inputs so much
that future creation is hampered. But this argument is getting a
little worn by now. In Econo-World, however, the content industries
have a second string to their bow. They turn from the economic
analysis of public goods problems to the economic analysis of price
discrimination.
III. PRICE DISCRIMINATION: A PRIMER
A little background may be helpful for those less familiar
with the economics of price discrimination. Imagine a world where
the economy consisted of a single supplier of a single good-Fur-
bies-and of four young purchasers each with different degrees of
willingness and ability to pay. Furbies cost $10 to produce. The poor
child can pay only $15 for the Furby (though if she were richer, she
would pay much more.) The two children of the middling class will
pay $25 each and the rich child would pay $85. What happens if the
supplier has to charge a single price? Selling the Furby at $15 will
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result in four customers and revenue of $60. The manufacturer's
profit would be $20.26 Selling at $25 each will lead to only three
sales as the poor child drops out, unable to bid so high. Yet the
revenue is $75 and the profit $45.27 Finally, selling at $85 will ex-
clude everyone but the rich child, but the manufacturer will receive
revenue of $85 and profit of $75.28 A rational manufacturer, there-
fore, will price at $85 and the middle and lower classes will go
Furby-less. While economic analysis recognizes no exogenously de-
termined right to the Furbied state, it would tell us to focus on the
a net social loss produced in this case-namely the three Furbies
that the supplier will not be able to sell, though the purchasers
would be willing to offer more than the costs of production. The net
social loss is $35,29 measured here according the standard assump-
tions of such analysis; that is to say, we measure worth or value
individual by individual, reckoning each according to the amount
that the individual is willing and able to pay.30
If, however, the supplier (a) was somehow able to identify
individual valuations and (b) could charge different prices for each
customer, this social loss could be avoided. The poor child would
pay $15, the two middle class kids would pay $25 each, Richie Rich
would fork out his $85-all would get Furbies, the social loss would
disappear, and the producer will gain a whopping profit of $110. 31 A
happy ending, at least by the standards of economic analysis.
26. Cost of manufacture: 4 X $10 = $40. Revenue: 4 x $15 = $60. Profit: ($60-$40) = $20.
27. Cost of manufacture: 3 X $10 = $30. Revenue: 3x $25 = $75. Profit: ($75-$30) = $45.
28. Cost of manufacture: I X $10 = $10. Revenue: 1 x $85 = $85. Profit: ($85-$10) = $75. Of
course, this hypothetical is unrealistic in a variety of ways. For example, there are no economies
of scale on production. The basic point, however, holds true if we shift to a more nuanced hypo-
thetical dealing with marginal utility and marginal cost in which all these factors are included
and the reader's eyes correspondingly more weary.
29. In other words, the amount by which the value that the poor and middle class children
put on the Furbies exceeds the cost of their production. Value: ($15 + $25 + $25) = $65. Cost of
Production: $30. Under the single pricing schedule, willing buyers cannot purchase though their
utility exceeds cost. The resulting loss is ($65 - $30) = $35. Those who find this definition of social
loss (particularly in the case of Furbies) to be ludicrous are asked to retain, but suspend, their
skepticism at least until the next footnote, and ideally until later in the Paper.
30. As many critics have pointed out, this raises some problems. Thus, for example, the
glass of water is "worth" only $1 to the person dying of thirst whose wallet holds but a single
dollar. Indeed, there would be a social loss of $3 if we gave him his drink instead of offering it to
the slightly overheated rich person who would pay $4 for it. More important perhaps, economic
analysts tend to measure social value by aggregation of individual assessments; the idea of a
value where the whole is more than the sum of the parts is hard to develop within this frame of
mind.
31. Cost of manufacture: 4 X $10 = $40. Revenue: ($15 +$25 + $25 +$85) = $150. Profit:
($150-$40) = $110.
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Before we continue, we should also notice the characteristics
of the monopoly producer, under perfect price discrimination; most
obviously, the producer never makes mistakes in its identification
of ability/willingness to pay. (For example, the producer does not
make the mistake of selling 4 $15 Furbies to the poor kid-"Please
sir, I am a poor purchaser and the other 3 are for my humble and
equally penurious brothers and sisters"-only to have this budding
arbitrageur turn round and resell to his peers at $20, repaying his
loan from the rich kid and reaping a tidy profit.) Let us take a small
step outside the imaginary world I have constructed. Imagine a
real-world firm that has some of the characteristics of a monopolist.
Take the manufacturer of Furbies, for example. Partly because of a
variety of intellectual property rights (trademark, trade dress, and
perhaps patents) the manufacturer of Furbies is safe from direct
competition. I cannot manufacture a competitor doll called a Furby;
indeed, depending on the extent of trade dress protection and the
extent of the patents on the underlying technology, I may be pre-
vented from making any annoying, neotenous, talking furry doll
with a "learning program" and a crude voice playback feature. The
consumers of Furbies will also insist that there are no substitute
goods and that the only limit on their parents' willingness to pay
ought to be parental ability to pay. Interestingly, the manufacturer
of Furbies actually chose to use a single standard price, for reasons
that make the whole analysis more complex, but let us imagine that
it wants to engage in price discrimination. How is it to do so? One
possibility is to increase the difficulty of getting the low cost Fur-
bies-selling them at inconvenient times in uncomfortable places.
Only the poor child, who is willing to spend in time, discomfort, and
stigma what he lacks in dollars, will buy them there. From the
manufacturer's point of view, this segments the market nicely. An-
other possibility, called "versioning," is to produce goods with dif-
ferent qualities or features: a bare bones "pauper's model," perhaps,
with a mutilated ear and a cough, a more luxurious Furby of the
bourgeoisie, its pelt rich but modest, and a tycoon Furby with a
larger vocabulary and a mink coat.
In both of these solutions the producer compensates for its
lack of knowledge about the consumer's ability and willingness to
pay by relying on knowledge of the characteristics of the more gen-
eral classes of purchaser and by using external signs and signifiers
to encourage self-selection into the appropriate pricing bracket. In
addition, the market can be segregated by time, early release at a
high price followed by a slow diminuendo designed to capture every
combination of eagerness and resources. The methods can even be
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amalgamated, for example, hardbacks are often issued before pa-
perbacks. Versioning can look perverse; Varian quotes the example
of a laser printer aimed at the business market that produced 8
pages per minute. In order to capture the personal computer mar-
ket, a version was sold with a "wait chip" that reduced its speed to 4
pages per minute. 32
When we are talking about "optionar' or luxury goods, or
about minor differences in functionality or prestige, this process
seems beneficial or at worst risible. Of course, when the goods get
more necessary and the disparities in wealth distribution (and
hence ability to pay) get more acute, the versioning process begins
to look less benign, suggesting an underlying problem with the
ability/willingness to pay metric of valuation-at least to those who
were not entirely convinced by the basic axioms of the analysis. The
quote from Dupuit with which I began this essay captures the proc-
ess perfectly. "What the company is trying to do is prevent the pas-
sengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling third
class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to
frighten the rich."33 To be sure, this is a point by no means limited
to discussion of price discrimination, and if this is the only way to
get some important social good to the poor, we may swallow our
qualms. What's more, in the digital realm it is possible that this
type of concern will not come up. Perhaps we will think that the
products are less socially valuable, or jettison any concern that poor
have access to them. Perhaps the differences between the high-end
good and its low rent cousin will be small enough that our con-
sciences can rest easy. Still, it is worth carrying with us for later
the thought that this kind of concern might exist.
So far, the techniques used by monopolists to engage in price
discrimination are relatively simple. But there are others, including
ones that will be of more importance in the digital world. Imagine
our Furby manufacturer again. Apart from versioning, or engaging
in temporal segmentation of the market, the Furby manufacturer
could use contract or technology as methods to ensure that Furbies
do not leak across the price boundary. Buyers could be made to sign
a contract saying that they were forbidden from reselling their
Furby, or even from giving it away. Furbies could be technologically
linked to some characteristic of their owners, perhaps through a
32. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 59 (1999).
33. DUPIT, supra note 1, at 23.
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retinal or DNA scan, and primed to self destruct if they were sold or
given away. Furbies could even be constructed so as to engage in
self-help if the terms of the contract were being circumvented, per-
haps taking the other toys hostage and refusing to release them
unless some payment was made. While all of this seems bizarre, if
not hallucinatory, these are exactly the kinds of techniques that
will increasingly be used by content providers in the digital world.
Programs might be tied to unique identifier numbers embedded in
software or hardware. Content providers will declare that content is
not being "sold," merely licensed subject to numerous restrictions.
Self-help sub-routines might be used to encrypt user-files in the
event of contractual violation, with the key only being provided on
payment of a fee and a return to proper behavior. Digital finger-
prints and watermarks will help to identify texts. Encryption will
be used to protect programs against decompilation, or to scramble
source code so that it cannot be parsed.
Let us say, however, that through an ingenious use of mar-
ket research, technological limitation, and licensing agreement, the
Furby manufacturer manages to sell to each customer at precisely
the maximum of his ability and willingness to pay. This is an effi-
cient allocation of resources. Of course, the interesting aspect of
this little thought experiment is that it is a story of a monopoly
with perfect price discrimination. There are no competitors selling
Furbies. What if there were? In a competitive market we would ex-
pect the price to move quickly towards the cost of production. All
the kids would get their Furbies for $10.00. Just as before, social
loss disappears (there is no Furby-shaped hole at the center of each
childish world of preferences) but now all of the $110 "surplus" (the
difference between what the good costs to make and what it is
worth to the buyers) is in the pockets of the consumers, not the pro-
ducer.3 4 From a standpoint of economic efficiency, this result is just
as desirable as the one above. We could be more precise. Either per-
fect competition, or monopoly with perfect price discrimination will
produce an optimal economic outcome. The differences are distribu-
tional. Perfect competition moves consumer surplus to the pockets of
consumers. Monopoly coupled with perfect price discrimination
34. In each case, the surplus is the degree to which the child's willingness to pay exceeds
the costs of production and (in the case of perfectly competitive market) of sale. Thus, the rich
kid actually has a larger "surplus" ($85-$10 = $75) because he would have been able (and willing)
to pay so much while the poor kid has a smaller surplus ($15-$10 = $5) because he is able (and
willing) to pay less. Such a method of analysis will thus tend to see greater social losses in the
thwarted desires of the rich than those of the poor. This, of course, is merely a corollary of the
point made earlier.
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moves the surplus to the pockets of the producer. Now in the actual
world, we live neither in a world of perfect competition, nor a world
of monopoly and perfect price discrimination. We know however,
that both ends of the spectrum are efficient. As informed policy
makers, who have read our economics textbooks and reflected on
the wonder of allocatively efficient markets, we are therefore faced
with a choice. Towards which one do we push?
In the post-lapsarian world of transaction costs, law may ac-
tually make a difference. The allocation of property rights, the or-
ganization of antitrust law, and the delineation of enforceable con-
tracts, may each have an effect on whether the market moves to-
wards a monopoly with perfect price discrimination or towards per-
fect competition. For example, if we weaken antitrust laws or even
grant state-enforced monopolies, allow contracts that bind third
parties, diminish privacy protections, add to the legal toolbox by
which manufacturers can prohibit resale, and even put the force of
law behind their technological attempts to do so, we may make it
easier for the monopoly to be created in the first place, for the mo-
nopolist to generate the information that he needs in order to en-
gage in effective price discrimination and then to give him the tools,
legal and technological, to make that price discrimination stick. If
we turn the legal rules in the opposite directions, we may make the
market more competitive. Let us return to our Furby example. Say
that, at present, the Furby company enjoys a limited royal charter.
Furby-competitors are legally restrained from making furry talking
dolls that children consider good substitutes. At present also, say
that the Furby company.is forbidden to gather certain kinds of in-
formation on children's preferences, that contracts which prohibit
resale are unenforceable, that price-maintenance agreements with
suppliers are illegal, and that Furby-buyers are allowed to "hack"
the software system that the manufacturers include in an attempt
to make the Furby responsive to only one buyer. The law, therefore,
is putting obstacles in the way of moving towards perfect competi-
tion (the royal charter) and also in the way of moving towards mo-
nopoly and perfect price discrimination (the privacy rules, the pro-
hibition of resale price maintenance and restraints on alienation,
the privilege of owners to circumvent technological restraints on
transfer).
We know that either perfect competition or monopoly with
perfect price discrimination will produce Pareto optimal results.
(No change in the distribution of entitlements will produce a gain
large enough for the "winners" under such a change, to compensate
the "losers" and still come out ahead.) We believe that there will be
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Pareto superior results if we approach very close either to perfect
competition or perfect price discrimination, (although it is not clear
what the shape of the curve is on either side). Do we try to swing
the market towards one or the other and, if so, towards which one?
The question, of course, is impossible to answer in the abstract. We
would have to know what the supposed benefits of the royal charter
were so that we could estimate the costs of weakening it. We would
have to put a valuation on the privacy protections that prevent
manufacturers from gathering all the information they need to en-
gage in accurate price discrimination. We would have to consider
the dynamic effects of any rule-change on innovation in future
products. We would also have to have some sense, as an empirical
matter, of how "far" we were from the perfect price-discrimination
model on the one hand and the perfectly competitive market on the
other, and the legal, administrative, and other costs of actually
making the change. After all, it is quite possible that we might ac-
tually push the system into a Pareto inferior equilibrium; after the
rule change, the winners might not be able to compensate the losers
and still come out ahead. We might actually have ethical or dis-
tributional commitments that changed the result of the analysis;
exogenously determined rights to privacy and free speech, for ex-
ample. We might believe that surplus in the hands of (generally
poorer) consumers was more valuable than surplus in the hands of
(generally richer) producers, because of the diminishing marginal
utility of wealth, or the ethical logic of the original position. In
short, the empirical uncertainties, ethical quandaries, and theoreti-
cal questions are manifold. Yet the legal and economic literature on
intellectual property and information goods shows a consistent
predilection to argue in favor of the necessity and desirability of
price discrimination 35 and this predilection is extremely attractive
to the lobbyists of Econo-World.
IV. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN ECONO-WORLD
Remember that the question for the legislators of Econo-
World was, to what extent should the law forbid, allow, or actively
promote the process of producer control over users and digital ob-
jects beyond the initial transaction? The wonderful, the truly splen-
diferous thing about the economic analysis of price discrimination is
that it seems to tell us that it is economically necessary for the pro-
35. See, for example, Fisher, supra note 2, at 1254-55, and the Varian sources cited supra
note 2.
20001 2027
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
viders of digital content to control the after-market use of all of the
technological and contractual methods that I described. Here is the
perfect argument to make to legislators. Legislators have to step in
to remove legal impediments to price discrimination, in fact to
criminalize attempts at arbitrage. They do so, not to confer another
huge chunk of monopoly rent on the content providers (though this
will be a byproduct of their actions), but instead to make sure that
the market is allocatively efficient. It is socially good for the news-
paper to be able to price high when selling to the high-
valuation/high-resources user, and low to the penurious student. If
the student could resell her discounted digital text to the wealthy
reader, the newspaper publisher would lose the incentive ever to
publish at the low price. Like the manufacturer forced to depend on
a single price for Furbies, the publisher would set the price at a
level that guaranteed optimum return, leaving a tragic triangle of
unmet need below that price. We are actually helping the poor by
allowing producers to control the after-market and to capture the
entire consumer surplus.
Now we get to a lovely irony of the debate. When intellectual
property rights were being justified using the economics of public
goods problems, the very first tactic of opponents was to yell "mo-
nopoly" and to conjure up both the economic and the social evils as-
sociated with monopoly control. Intellectual property rights would
lead to classic monopoly pricing, they suggested, with a deadweight
social loss: customers who are willing and able to pay more than
marginal cost, but who cannot afford to pay the monopolist's opti-
mal (single) price. In reply, the defenders of intellectual property
rights pooh-poohed the talk of monopoly. Copyright and patent are
simply property rights that give producers an ability to exclude.
Market circumstances might make a monopoly. The grant of an in-
tellectual property right did not. Competition with other substitute
goods (also protected by intellectual property) would drive the price
down to a position much closer to marginal cost, so that the dead-
weight loss would be much smaller.
But now we have reached the second stage of the debate.
Should the state facilitate the process of price discrimination? Let
us start just by looking at allocative efficiency, without getting into
a more complex analysis of dynamic innovation effects. If we truly
have a market that exhibits the classic downward sloping demand
curve under monopoly pricing, then there is a strong argument that
the state should step in and aid the producers in their attempt to
price discriminate-for all the reasons discussed in the Furby ex-
ample. Monopolies with perfect price discrimination are efficient, by
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definition. If on the other hand, the market distribution of the
product under the existing regime gets it to lots of consumers at
marginal cost or close to it, then we are closer to the kinds of re-
sults produced by a competitive market and no change of legal re-
gime is necessary.3 6 Even if the state were able to change the rules
in a way that would transform the marketplace, the change would
be purely distributional. Consumer surplus would simply be shifted
away from consumers to producers.
Notice what has happened. Suddenly, the defenders of intel-
lectual property expansion have an incentive to argue that this is
already a monopoly (and so we need to move to price discrimination
in order to achieve efficiency) while the critics of intellectual prop-
erty expansion move towards saying that, even with intellectual
property, the existing market often actually already distributes the
good at very close to marginal cost. The positions have completely
switched from the first stage of the analysis.
So what does the current pattern of market distribution look
like? The marginal cost of information is zero. So the alternative to
the monopoly-plus-perfect-price discrimination model is one where
producers are granted a return adequate to achieve future produc-
tion, and then the good is available free. Now there are a number of
proposals to achieve exactly this kind of system, the most recent
being that of Steve Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele for an op-
tional system of state rewards to inventors, followed by distribution
at marginal cost.37 But what about the existing framework of intel-
lectual property in the digital arena? As Wendy Gordon points out,
intellectual property doctrine itself can be seen as a rough form of
price discrimination. 38 The rights handed out to copyright holders,
for example, allow segregation of high intensity/high valuation uses
(performance, reproduction) from lower valuation uses (distribu-
tion), and the existence of first sale rights and fair use rights allows
some users to buy the good at a reduced price or even obtain it free.
Beyond this world is an after-market very different from the per-
fectly controlled one imagined by the content industries. Libraries,
36. For reasons expanded on in a moment, the question is not whether the market is a per-
fectly competitive one, but rather whether it achieves a distribution fairly close to the one that a
perfectly competitive market would produce. With information goods, which have a marginal cost
of zero, this is actually possible in a market that lacks some of the characteristics economists
normally assume in a perfectly competitive market.
37. See STEVEN SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS VERSUS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 20-27 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6956, 1999),
available at http://papers.nber.org/papers.
38. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1375-78.
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fuzzier uses (copies made for the laptop, for the car), petty illegal
uses (copies made for friends), Napster-like "sharing" outside the
permissible limits of the copyright law, and straightforward piracy,
all combine to get information products to many people at very close
to marginal cost. The system is a leaky one in two respects; the in-
tellectual property owner's rights are not absolute (yet) and the
mercurial quality of the product itself means that both gray and
black markets supply the good at very close to marginal cost-zero.
Now it is unlikely that the legislature will be enormously receptive
to the claim that piracy isn't such a bad thing, but even so this
situation is tolerable as long as (a) there are adequate incentives,
cultural, criminal, and commercial, to ensure the continuation of a
large lawful market and thus to (b) provide adequate incentives to
the producer of the information good. Under those situations, we
offer no cheers for the pirate, but no tears either. Leakiness is built
into the system. If society has provided the producer with an ade-
quate incentive to ensure future production, claims to scarce law
enforcement and legislative services to ensure heightened returns,
and the capturing of all consumer surplus, are economically ques-
tionable.
We are, in other words, in an even more ambiguous position
than the Furby manufacturer who has a royal charter, but who
cannot prevent reverse engineering, competition, and resale. Infor-
mation has a marginal cost of zero and limited excludability, and
yet is bundled and tied to other goods, services and cultural mean-
ings that have a higher degree of excludability. Older intellectual
property law provided a deliberately messy and leaky system that
actually seems like it might get information to many users at a
price adequate to ensure future production, while others got it
free. 9 To be sure, there is little hard empirical evidence, but that
failing is shared equally by both sides of the argument. And while
price discrimination works neatly in the hypotheticals about Fur-
bies, which have a marginal cost above zero, the case for price dis-
crimination is weaker with pure information goods, when marginal
cost falls to zero.
As Yochai Benkler points out in this volume, with perfect
price discrimination we know that the producer of information
would have no incentive to distribute it to that group of consumers
who could only pay marginal cost (zero) for it. Yet if those users
would be willing to give their attention to zero-cost information,
39. See generally id.
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there is a welfare loss if we fail to provide it to them. What's more,
any analyst who is even a little uneasy about the "ability and will-
ingness to pay" metric of valuation would find it particularly hard
to say that the poor should not get access to a social resource with
zero marginal cost simply because they cannot afford to pay for it.
If there is an argument over the efficiency justification for
having the state step in and help producers in their attempt to
achieve more perfect price discrimination, are there other factors
that break the tie, so to speak? What of more dynamic concerns
about the encouragement of innovation? Some analysts clearly find
this point to be persuasive. William Fisher's article, which I men-
tioned at the beginning of this Essay, advocates using the lure of
the profits promised by legally aided price discrimination to get
producers to accept a variety of socially conscious limitations on
their intellectual property rights.40 Thus his argument hardly fits
into the maximalist intellectual property agenda I am describing.
But it is clear that he believes that price discrimination would have
positive effects not only on efficiency but also on innovation. As he
puts it,
the ratio of the monopoly profits enjoyed by the author to the concomitant dead-
weight losses [under price discrimination] is much larger.... So what? That means,
first of all, that social welfare losses have been reduced. In addition, we are getting
much more bang for our buck-a much larger incentive for creative activity per
unit of social cost.4'
Now while there is much to agree with in Professor Fisher's article,
I think the implications of this argument are troublesome. True, the
incentive would be larger in the sense that producers of information
goods would receive more money (though for both creative and non-
creative activity; price discrimination measures could give addi-
tional protection to each.) But would this give us more bang for our
buck in terms of actually producing more innovation, and more in-
formation goods? To answer that question, we would have to know
about the effect of price discrimination on the cost of inputs into the
productive process as well as the price of outputs from the produc-
tive process. Under price discrimination, after all, producers of in-
formation goods might well be paying more for inputs than they do
now under the current leaky system, with limited enforceability of
contracts of adhesion, first sale, fair use, and so on. Producers
would have strong incentive to identify and restrict potential com-
petitors through technology and contract, or at least to charge them
40. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1212-16.
41. Id. at 1240.
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very high prices.42 It would also be important to study the impor-
tance to innovation of that subset of information that content pro-
ducers cannot currently control, and which is available as a result
at its marginal cost of zero, but which they would be able to control
under the legally sanctioned price discrimination regime.
To put it simply, the assumption that increasing the pricing
power of the producer increases the amount of innovation and in-
formation produced is similar to the assumption that increasing the
level of intellectual property rights produces more innovation. In-
tellectual property policy has to focus on the input side of the table
as well as the output side of the table. In Econo-World, the critics of
intellectual property expansion did this by focusing on the inhibit-
ing effects of monopolies such as intellectual property rights on fu-
ture innovation, and the deadweight loss they impose upon pricing
decisions. When it comes to the price discrimination argument,
however, the critics of intellectual property expansion will stress
the way in which the current system is leaky enough to get the
goods to many people at zero marginal cost. "Curing" that leaki-
ness, they argue, may well result in both welfare loss and innova-
tion loss. If the marginal cost of a good is zero, increasing contrac-
tual and technical control may simply make sure that a portion of
the market is no longer served at all. We lose leakiness without
gaining perfect distribution.
The defenders of intellectual property expansionism in
Econo-World, on the other hand, initially argued that intellectual
property rights were simply property rights, not monopolies. When
it comes to price discrimination, however, their argument was sim-
ple: "Well, since we already have a monopoly, the only efficient
market is a monopoly with perfect price discrimination. What's
more, the greater the amount of consumer surplus captured by the
producer, the greater the incentive to create future information
42. Professor Fisher is one of the few who attempt to address this point, essentially reintro-
ducing a fair use privilege for decompilation, future production, and so on. See id. at 1208-09.
However, while these limitations on the total control regime move in the right direction, they
only deal with innovation inputs in the final stages of creation-excluding the subtler contribu-
tions for which future creators can claim no creative fair use privilege, precisely because they
involve serendipitous creativity, rather than planned construction. Thus judgements about the
relative effect of perfect price discrimination on innovation will depend on judgements about
whether or not more relevant information is likely to be available at marginal cost under such a
regime or under the messier, leaky system we have now. Analyses that focus only on the out-
put/incentive side of the table will miss this point, just as analyses that focus only on the incen-
tive effects of intellectual property miss the importance of the public domain.
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goods." Once again, the arguments are mirror images of one an-
other.
Two further arguments about price discrimination deserve
further notice, though neither of them would be particularly com-
pelling in Econo-World. The first returns to the "ability and will-
ingness to pay" metric. There are particularly strong reasons for
doubting this way of valuing information goods. The endpoint of the
perfect price discrimination plan is a pay-per-view world where
each of us gets to see, use, and consume only those information
goods for which we would be willing to pay, even if at a very low
level per page. The idea of consumer sovereignty rests on the com-
pelling argument that people know what is good for them and can
value it accordingly. Whether or not one accepts that premise eve-
rywhere else, and I would argue that no one accepts it everywhere
else, it is particularly hard to say that information can be valued in
such a way.
With other goods we price partly by gathering more and
more information about the value of the product. The paradox of
information pricing is that, to know what it is worth to you, you
would need to know what it is, but if you know what it is, then you
no longer need to purchase. More importantly, the valuation we put
on apparently random, irrelevant information is shaped by our ex-
perience as "consumers" of such information in the past. The as-
sumption of endogenous preferences notwithstanding, legal regimes
can affect preferences and valuations. Most of the people who read
this Article are the products of a leaky and imperfectly controlled
system, an information ecology, in which they could get access to
large quantities of apparently irrelevant information because it was
"free." They learned that the book next to the one you are supposed
to be researching for your paper is always the most interesting, and
that the accumulation of apparently useless information pays divi-
dends in the long run. What kind of preferences will be formed in
the generation that comes of age in the world of perfect price dis-
crimination, with the Visa card symbol always spinning in the
background, and the micro-charges always ticking? Would they
spend fifteen minutes (and some number of cents) reading about
Caesar's campaigns when they were supposed to be studying cesar-
ean sections, about the Manhattan Project when they were sup-
posed to be learning about Manhattan? It is possible, of course, that
a world of perfect price discrimination would offer just as much free
information, and just as much ability to experiment, to come to new
understandings of one's self and thus of one's preferences. But we
have no data either way, and both the economics and the business
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plans of the world of state-backed price discrimination point in ex-
actly the other direction. 43 The vision of "worth," "usefulness," and
"welfare" offered by the conjunction of ability and willingness to pay
is a problematic one in general, but it is particularly problematic if
used as the metric for allocation of rights over information.
The second problem with the image of perfect state-backed
price discrimination is that it would require massive information-
gathering on the part of producers and, perhaps ultimately, of the
state. Perfect price discrimination requires more information about
customers than can be revealed by mere self-selection and more in-
formation-gathering (to prevent illicit arbitrage, lending, or gifts).
Do we really want to commit ourselves to a regime that will offer
companies major assistance in the form of state power, assistance
that will yield them big bucks, but only if they monitor their cus-
tomers superlatively well? This seems like a rather perverse set of
incentives. On dubious theoretical and empirical evidence, it sets
up a system that more or less guarantees an unpleasant form of
invasive monitoring. Even if we establish legally enforceable pri-
vacy principles (which would be hard to reconcile with the basic
premise of the system) all the incentives run in one, anti-social di-
rection. Along with the threat to privacy comes the threat to free
architecture. Many of the Internet's attractive features as a speech
technology-its openness, its resistance to filtration by both public
and private power, its anonymity-seem like bugs rather than fea-
tures from the point of view of perfect price discrimination. The re-
gime of price discrimination would function far better in a network
which had unique identifiers coded into hardware (as with the chip
that Intel recently released)44 and software, 45 and in which the en-
tire "cickstream" was monitored from moment to moment. If pay-
ment is required for even very small sips of information, of course,
43. To get a sense of what the world might look like, one should probably turn to Hal Var-
ian's work. I would argue that Fisher's work with its public spirited and thoughtful attempts to
leverage price discrimination into "semiotic democracy" does not predict the actual practice of a
state-sponsored regime of price discrimination nearly as well as Varian's cheerful advice to busi-
ness people on how they can milk their customers and block their competitors. Compare Fisher,
supra note 2, at 1217, with Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Lock 'em Up! What You Should Know
About Customer Loyalty and the Competitive Concept of Lock-in, CIO, at 72, 75-76 (Oct. 15 1998),
available at http://www.cio.com/archive/101598-book.html, and Hal R. Varian, Priceline's Magic
Show: The Name-your-price Retailer Has an Old Trick Up its Sleeve, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD
(Apr. 17, 2000), http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/O,1151,14015,00.html.
44. See Intel Drops Processor Serial Numbers, 7.08 ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER 3
(May 2, 2000), at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC-Alertj7.08.html.
45. See John Markoff, Microsoft Will Alter its Software in Response to Privacy Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at Al.
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many of these problems will be "taken care of," though not in any
way we would like.
Once again, however, the legislators of Econo-World were
unimpressed by these arguments. They voted for the entire package
of price discrimination measures, adding the force of law to the
digital fences, abolishing the exclusions on contracts of adhesion,
and repealing the prohibitions on resale price maintenance. "At
last," they declared, "we have evolved from the messy and unprop-
ertized world of the past into an era in which information and in-
formation goods will be moved to their highest use-value." A few
critical and disconsolate economists claimed that the plan had
merely piled bad economics on top of bad economics. First, they
claimed, the legislature had expanded intellectual property rights
unnecessarily, showering the content providers with economically
unjustified monopolies in the new medium and completely neglect-
ing the importance of the public domain. Then, in the second stage
of the analysis, they claimed that the legislature had looked at the
unnecessary monopolies it had created and, on the claim that the
only efficient monopolistic market is a monopoly with perfect price
discrimination, had handed over another huge slice of rights to the
content providers. Once again, the powerful economic arguments
against the move had been ignored. Error had been premised on
error. These economists, however, were distinctly in the minority
and their criticisms did not receive very good coverage. The lobby-
ists retired to their chambers to plan again.
V. BEYOND ECONO-WORLD
Econo-World is not our world. The critic would say that this
is because our legislature is interested less in economic arguments
than in more straightforward economic contributions. While I do
not agree with the Chicago and Virginia School portrayals of all
legislation as rent-seeking behavior by particular interests, it would
be hard to find a more perfect example of rent-seeking than intel-
lectual property legislation. 46 Why bother exploring the economics of
46. As one commentator observed,
Copyright legislation in the United States has for at least a century been
drafted not by the Congress, and not by the executive branch, but by multilat-
eral negotiations among private industry representatives, sometimes with the
assistance of the legislative branch. Copyright bills that have been drafted by
some other process-by members of Congress, Congressional staffers, or agen-
cies in the executive branch-have failed to achieve enough support for enact-
ment.
Jessica Litman, Copyright and the Internet in the United States, Address Before the Interna-
tional Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (July
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intellectual property at all, then? Campaign contributions and not
downward sloping demand curves will determine the results. Can
you really explain the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
economically, perhaps as an attempt to offer incentives to the
dead?47 The answer, I think, is that the economic analysis does still
matter, and not just the economics of public choice theory.48 It mat-
ters in the debates, shifting the participants' perceptions of what
constitutes a reasonable opening position. It matters enormously in
implementation, when administrators and judges try very hard to
make good public policy out of the legislation they have been
handed. It may matter in constitutional litigation as judges assess
whether the recent crop of intellectual property legislation can be
construed in any way as an attempt to encourage authors and in-
ventors.49 And finally, it matters in more utopian ways, because we
cannot know what proposals to support and what to criticize with-
out some sense of their likely economic effects.
In this Article, I have tried in a very, very short space to lay
out some of the basic economic arguments for and against the crea-
tion of intellectual property rights and then for and against the in-
stitution of price discrimination. From my point of view, the same
pairs of arguments appear again and again, from the highest level
of analysis (are informationally efficient markets possible?) to the
lowest (would price discrimination reduce innovation by raising the
price of information inputs into future products)? Economists like to
imagine a cool process of "balancing," or a game theoretic analysis
of strategy and counter-strategy, in which we try to find the effi-
cient frontier between the need for incentives and the need for the
free flow of information. I argued here, by contrast, that much of
the important work is done before the balancing or the gaming even
begins, in the construction of the issue to be analyzed. I deliberately
set up my analysis in rhetorically loaded terms; a tale of relent-
lessly grasping content industries, persuading legislators to grant
7-10, 1999) (footnotes omitted), available at http://www.msen.com/-litman/atrip.htm. See gener-
ally Jessica D. IAtman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857
(1987).
47. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (1999)).
48. To be sure, other things matter as well, including more romantic ideas of authorial crea-
tion, implicit ideas of the importance of information to the public and private spheres, and so on.
But I have tried to deal with those issues elsewhere. See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFrWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
49. See Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 535, 558 (2000).
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them larger and larger monopoly rents on the basis of poor eco-
nomic analysis. I did this for two reasons. First, because it is true,
or at least closer to truth than the cooler language of the little eco-
nomic parables used to explain public goods problems. Second, such
an overt loading of the scales triggers the very sophisticated rhe-
torical filters that all of us have developed to deal with arguments
about public policy in other areas-the environment, say. And if
there is one thing that intellectual property policy needs it is more
careful scrutiny of the rhetoric of economic analysis.
More substantively, the debate in Econo-World casts some
light, I think, on the real history of intellectual property policy over
the last twenty-five years, a history that could be summed up as the
failure to consider the input side of the input-output table. Intellec-
tual property policy has consistently under-valued the public do-
main, over-emphasized the threats and under-emphasized the op-
portunities presented by new technologies, ignored the extent to
which information and information goods are actually bundled with
other more excludable phenomena, exaggerated the role that incen-
tives have in producing innovation while minimizing their negative
effects, and so on.
The price discrimination debate adds some nice twists to the
story. Two ironies are glaringly apparent. First, I argued that the
move to price discrimination is a move that, in our world at least, is
partly premised on the creation of unnecessary monopolies. To put
it another way, there is something truly perverse about the idea
that once the legislature has created an unnecessary and counter-
productive intellectual property right over databases, they then
have to turn around and give a second heaping slice of monopoly
rent to the content-providers, because the only two types of efficient
markets are perfect competition and monopoly with perfect price
discrimination. The popular definition of chutzpah is the child who
kills his parents and then throws himself upon the mercy of the
court because he is an orphan. The economic definition of chutzpah
is the industry that demands a legalized monopoly, and then, once
given it even though the evidence was weak, insists on the state's
aid in price discrimination, the better to wring every last cent of
consumer surplus out of their customers.
Second, and this is an irony that cuts as much against me as
for me, I would predict a lovely inversion in arguments, as econo-
mists turn their attention to the advantages of price discrimination
in digital markets. In the debate over the creation of intellectual
property rights, critics yell "monopoly" and conjure up the image of
both the static welfare losses and the dynamic innovation losses
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that result from monopoly. The other side of the argument counters
with the claim that intellectual property rights are not monopolies,
merely property rights the exercise of which is chastened by the
availability of substitute goods. When we turn to the argument over
state aid for price discrimination, the critics switch sides, pointing
out the many ways in which the leakiness of existing law and tech-
nology and the privileges given to users by intellectual property
rights allow much information to be available at the price it would
fetch in a perfectly competitive market; its marginal cost, namely
zero. Defenders of price discrimination on the other hand, I would
predict, will start from the assumption of strong monopolies and
inadequate substitute goods; with these features, only price dis-
crimination can prevent welfare losses.
So will the economic defense of price discrimination provide
the justificatory rhetoric for the next (or perhaps the current) phase
* of intellectual property expansion? Certainly the fit is a beautiful
one. The agenda of the content industries is to use state-backed
digital fences to enclose both their own products and large chunks
of the public domain, to use licensing contracts to increase their
control of digital objects after the consumer gets access to them,
and to rest these two methods on a new menu of expansive intellec-
tual property protections. The economic analysis of price discrimi-
nation provides a cool and apparently objective reason why state
aid for the first two projects would be not only profitable but effi-
cient. I would predict therefore that among the mandarin class of
policy analysts we will see much more of it, generally without the
carping objections raised here.
What about more popular public debate? As I have tried to
demonstrate elsewhere, 50 the romance with which we view author-
ial creation and the incentives/public goods story combine to pro-
vide a very powerful public rhetoric in support of expansive intel-
lectual property rights. Will the analysis of price discrimination be
the rhetorical superstructure for the public justification of the con-
tent industries' current initiative? There, I think the answer is
probably no, though I am prepared to be surprised. Lay people often
react to differential pricing for the same good with a sense of un-
fairness. No matter how many times they are lectured by the
economists that it is actually to the benefit of all that producers be
able to charge different prices to groups with different ability and
willingness to pay, the popular reaction is normally "that's not fair."
50. See generally BOYLE, supra note 48.
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Economists have tended to view this as a sign of the public's naive
failure to understand market mechanisms. If the drug company can
charge the poor nation a low price and the rich nation a high price
for the same drug, all will be better off.51 It is better, then, that
gray markets, parallel imports, and resale be prohibited. Popular
resistance can be branded as a kind of economically illiterate Jaco-
binism.
There is certainly some truth to this depiction; there are in-
.eted benefits to price discrimination under certain circumstances.
But I would like to think that the popular skepticism towards price
discrimination also reflects something much more rational. Lacking
time to educate themselves in every aspect of market and culture,
the public tends to be skeptical when an industry claims that expert
opinion shows that what is good for the company will also be good
for the nation, and that state aid in enforcing its desires will pro-
duce an economically efficient result. And you know what? Given
the arguments reviewed in this Paper, I would say that the public
has a point.
51. The actual world of drug patenting and pricing turns out to be less benign. Poor coun-
tries do not in fact necessarily pay less; pricing power may have something to do with volume
discounts, the range of alternative drugs in different countries, and the degree of regulatory
control with which the state can threaten the drug company. Sometimes at least, the story in-
volves the very pattern I described in this Article; the granting of unnecessary intellectual prop-
erty rights in the first place is then used as the premise that the drug company also deserves the
support of the state and the international community in milking those rights. Critics can be
described as economically illiterate, though the real option is not just arbitrage, but a competi-
tive market in the production of a public domain drug. See Gregory Palast, Keep Taking Our
Tablets, (No One Else's), THE OBSERVER, July 23, 2000, at 7. Ironically, the United States, which
has long argued that other countries should prohibit "parallel imports" and other attempts to get
around price discrimination, is now moving towards allowing parallel imports of prescription
drugs. See Lawmakers Mull Measures to Ease Imports of Prescription Drugs, CHEMICAL MARKET
REPORTER, Sept. 25, 2000, at 36, 36.
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